INTRODUCTION
This paper offers a preliminary and conceptual look at the use of indicators to evaluate forest sector law enforcement and governance. Corrupt and illegal practices are widespread in the forest sector, they pose a major threat to the sustainable management of forest resources, and hamper economic growth, equitable income distribution, and efforts at poverty reduction. More specifically illegal practices may: 1. Put at risk the livelihoods of the poor and forest dependent populations who rely heavily on timber and non-timber forest products. 2. Distort markets for timber and pose an obstacle to responsible forest operators attempting to practice SFM. 3. Lead to a leakage of resources (tax revenues in particular) that legitimately belong in the government treasury for possible use in protecting and improving the quality of the resource and other development activities 1 . 4. Make a significant addition to the illegal or unofficial economy and therefore jeopardise national monetary and exchange rate policies, and encourage other illegal activities. 5. Directly threaten ecosystems, biodiversity and environmental services in protected areas and parks. 6. Reduce the intended beneficial impacts of forest sector projects and contribute to their failure.
Improving forest law enforcement and governance reduces illegalities and establishes a better environment for sustainable forest management. To be successful, it requires a reasonably good understanding of the illegal practices in the sector. It also requires the establishment of a baseline, which can capture the extent of the problem and a set of indicators to monitor progress of the recommended actions.
ILLEGAL PRACTICES IN THE FOREST SECTOR
Recent papers have identified a broad range of illegal practices in the forest sector:
Indicators to monitor progress of forest law enforcement and governance initiatives to control illegal practices in the forest sector (Callister 1999 ).
• ''Illegal logging' has no single definition. It is not a legal term derived from treaties, statutes, or court opinions. Neither is it a technical term that professionals use in a consistent way. In a general sense, 'illegal logging takes place when timber is harvested, transported, bought or sold in violation of national laws' (Brack and Hayman 2001) . This broad definition includes almost any illegal act that may occur between the growing of the tree and the arrival of the forest-based product in the hands of the consumer' (Rosenbaum 2003) .
Consistent with the above definitions, Box 1 presents examples of some of the most prevalent illegal acts in the forest sector.
INDICATORS TO MONITOR PROGRESS: GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
Indicators are necessary to pick up early warning signs of forest crime, to identify problem areas, to track the progress of interventions, and to allow for appropriate modifications and timely correction of intervention strategies. That is why indicators are often considered synonymous with instruments for monitoring and evaluation. Indicators can be harbingers of 'good-news' as well as 'bad-news'. For example, an indicator of scholastic achievement that all of us have grown up with, and have viewed with pride at some time but with dread at other, is our school report card! However, 'good news' should not lull us into complacency, but should encourage us to look closely for opportunities for improvement. By the same token, 'bad-news' should not be seen as a failure per se but as an opportunity to learn from mistakes and to minimise the scope of future errors.
Indicators 
Woodlands arson
• Setting woodlands on fire to convert them to commercial uses arbitrary scales of, say, 1-5 or 1-10, or ask people to assign situations to a limited set of ordered categories (e.g. 'Are concession terms violated almost always, often, sometimes, seldom, or never?'). 3. Indicators can vary in precision. An indicator of economic activity may report a figure to the nearest dollar or to the nearest million dollars. An indicator of deforestation may report in hectares or thousands of hectares. Ideally, an indicator's precision should reflect its presumed accuracy, or the reported figures should include some notion of the uncertainty attached. 4. Indicators can vary in accuracy. The distinction between accuracy and precision is worth remembering. An indicator can report a figure to the nearest dollar and be off by a factor of ten, or it could report to the nearest million and be exactly right. Thomas et al. 2000) .
From a practical perspective, the monitor will have to face up to the challenge of 'trading-off' amongst the desirable qualities of indicators. For example, an indicator may be both easy and cheap to measure, but it may be relatively insensitive to the project objectives. Political palatability is likely to be a frequently contentious issue, and often the monitor may have to compromise by trading-off cardinal rankings against broader ordinal categories. In addition, in all likelihood several indicators will be necessary to monitor project progress in a reliable and comprehensive way. Finding the compromises amongst the desirable qualities, and determining the most relevant set of indicators is not an easy task. It is best opened up to a broad-based consultation process involving the stakeholders responsible for the execution, and affected by the outcomes of the project. This will likely result in objective selection of indicators, identification of the responsibilities for their timely collection and dissemination, and consensus on how to use them in positive ways.
Examples of indicators to monitor the progress of FLEG initiatives
What indicators can monitors use to measure the progress of FLEG initiatives? Table 1 contains an extended though preliminary list of illegalities and associated indicators. For each class of illegality the table identifies some ideal indicators, which are probably unavailable but which identify the desired focus of monitoring. It also identifies some more practical indicators that might cast some light on progress.
As an example, consider the indicators that might track the extent of illegality in awarding concessions. The ideal indicators would report the relative number of awards influenced by unlawful activities. If the monitor knew the following with confidence, it would have an excellent way to track the progress of efforts to ensure that concession awards were lawful:
• The percent of concession awards influenced by bribery, cronyism, patronage, or the like.
• The percent of concession awards involving fraudulent applications.
• The percent of concession awards affected by extortion.
• The percent of concession awards affected by unintentional but unlawful acts, such as failure to follow legal mandated award processes.
These ideal indicators are almost certainly unavailable. Indeed, if unlawful concessions could be so readily identified, honest governments could easily prevent or suppress the unlawful acts. The obtainable quantitative data is likely to provide a much less direct measurement of illegal activity. Depending on the transparency of the concession system, the available indicators might include these: • The percent of major concession awards drawing multiple competitive bids. • The percent of awards granted to the highest bidder.
• The percent of awards (determined by number, area, or volume) that on their face comply with law regarding location, size, and number of concessions.
• The records of concessions voided after discovery of illegality.
These indicators all have some correlation to illegal activity, but each is flawed. Auctions can draw multiple bids and still be fixed. High bids can come from irresponsible operators whom the government legitimately avoids. Concessions that appear lawful can still involve corruption. In addition, many illegal concessions are never exposed as such.
The above indicators are scalar; some Boolean (i.e. true or false) indicators also could be useful. These include the following:
• Whether public notice and opportunity to bid is given before the award of a major concession.
• Whether bids are made public after the concession is awarded.
• Whether the rules for awarding concessions are publicly available.
• Whether there is a process for unsuccessful bidders and other interested parties to challenge concession awards.
• Whether there is an independent internal government watchdog that polices the concession process.
• Whether there is a requirement for government forest officials to disclose financial interests in the forest sector, or for concession holders to disclose familial connections to the government.
These are all statements about the process rather than the outcome. They are neither necessary nor sufficient to guarantee that all concessions are lawful. However, they all reflect aspects of the process that tend to prevent or suppress illegality. Taken singly none is a strong indicator of legality, but a large group of Boolean indicators like these taken together can provide a replicable and comparable snapshot of the prevalence of deterrence mechanisms.
With some investment of effort, a monitor might be able to collect new data and generate new indicators. For example, even if the government itself kept few records, the monitor could select a sample of recent concessions and investigate how they were awarded. Alternatively, the monitor could conduct an opinion survey measuring the reputation of the concession process for honesty.
CONCLUSIONS
Corrupt and illegal practices in the forest sector can be a strong constraint to achieving sustainable forest management and there is an urgent need to control such practices through initiatives to improve forest law enforcement and governance. In this context, developing appropriate indicators to measure the performance of FLEG initiatives is a key requirement, and this paper makes a preliminary contribution to this need. It also provides a point of departure for policy makers to go about identifying a set of indicators for a specific FLEG initiative in the context of its own special circumstances such as the country situation, etc. It is envisaged that the selection of indicators takes place through a consultative process involving all major stakeholders who stand to be affected by the FLEG initiative. It is also anticipated that the consultative process will identify the agency/ies responsible for collecting information on the indicators and how the associated costs will be met. In overall terms, consultations will likely ensure that the monitoring information is used effectively to bring about improvements in the FLEG initiative.
Furthermore, the information in Table 1 can be helpful in alerting policy makers to the opportunity of 'piggybacking' on to reforms in other sectors to control illegal practices in the forest sector. As an example, making a provision that the financing of new processing capacity be financed only by banks and agencies subscribing to the Equator principles into a programme of general banking Finally, it must be emphasised that documenting the lessons learned from field-testing of indicators and their widespread dissemination will be an important means to make progress in this area. The international community of practice should be prepared to take up this challenge.
